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Abstract 
Few  industries  are  more  concentrated  than  the  global  fashion  industry.  We  analyse  the 
geography and evolution of the ready-to-wear fashion design industry by looking at the yearly 
entry rates following an organizational ecology approach. In contrast to earlier studies on 
manufacturing industries, we find that legitimation effects are local and competition effects 
are global. This result points to the rapid turnover of ideas in fashion on the one hand and the 
global demand for fashion apparel on the other hand. We attribute the decline of Paris in the 
post-war period to 'institutional lock-in', which prevented a ready-to-wear cluster to emerge as 
vested  interested  of  haute  couture  designers  were  threatened.  An  extended  organizational 









Few industries are more concentrated than the global fashion industry. Most of the successful 
fashion designers are located in a handful of cities, Paris, New York, London and Milan. 
Before the Second World War, Paris was the single centre in global fashion design. It was 
only after 1945 that Paris lost its dominance with London, Milan and - notably - New York 
emerging as new centers of fashion creativity. 
 
Some have related the rather sudden shift from a mono-centred to a poly-centred geography 
of fashion design to the emergence of ready-to-wear (prêt-à-porter) fashion (Waddell, 2004). 
Parisian designers dominated haute couture but were initially reluctant to embrace the ready-
to-wear segment, which became the main segment during the postwar period. Most Parisian 
designers considered ready-to-wear too commercial and a threat to the high standards of haute 
couture.  For a while, French haute couturiers were not even allowed to practice ready-to-
wear according to the guidelines of the Syndicate Chamber of Parisian Couture.  
 
We  propose  to  explain  the  geography  and  evolution  of  the  ready-to-wear  fashion  design 
industry by looking at the yearly entry rates following an organizational ecology approach. 
The main contribution is that we provide the first organizational ecology study on a 'creative 
industry' (Scott, 2000) whereas previous contributions focused on manufacturing and service 
sectors (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Hannan et al. (1995); Bigelow et al. (1997); Carroll and 
Hannan, 2000). In the first part of the paper, we ask the question to what extent the insights 
from  organizational  ecology  obtained  so  far  are  transferable  to  creative  industries.    In 
particular, we question the universality of the results of Hannan et al. (1995) and Bigelow et 
al. (1997) who found that in the car industry legitimation effects (or ‘knowledge spillovers’) 4 
 
were global and competition was local. In the fashion industry, we expect the opposite to be 
true due to the rapid turnover of fashion ideas on the one hand and the global demand for 
fashion apparel on the other hand.  
 
In the second part of the paper, we focus on the decline of Paris with the advent of ready-to-
wear. In particular, we discuss the specific role played by the Syndicate Chamber of Parisian 
Couture that blocked entry in the new ready-to-wear segment. We understand this historical 
context as a case of institutional lock-in which prevented a new, related cluster to emerge 
from an existing cluster as vested interested were threatened. To assess this claim empirically, 
we analyse the effect of the presence of haute couture designers on ready-to-wear foundings 
in the various cities in an extended organizational ecology framework. 
 
We proceed as follows. We first explain in section 2 the core model of organizational ecology 
and how it can be applied at different geographical scales simultaneously to assess the level at 
which legitimation and competition processes take place. We then discuss our data collection 
process in section 3 and present the results of our analysis in section 4. The specific history of 
the Parisian cluster, and the role of the Syndicate Chamber of Parisian Couture herein, is 
discussed and analysed in section 5. We end with a conclusion in section 6. 
 
 
2. Organizational ecology 
 
The main goal of organizational ecology studies is to understand the dynamics of populations 
of  organizations  (Hannan  and  Freeman,  1989;  Hannan  and  Carroll,  1992).  The  ecology 
analogy  refers  to  the  concept  of  markets  as  niches  that,  once  established,  are  filled  by 5 
 
organizations until the carrying capacity of the niche is reached. In ecological processes, the 
rate of birth of new entities is density dependent. When the niche is discovered, the birth rate 
is positively dependent on density as each existing entity will bring forth new entities. The 
number of offspring eventually exceeds the number of parent organizations. With the niche 
becoming saturated, density becomes detrimental for birth due to competition for resources. 
Specifically, the population level will stabilize at a level depending on the carrying capacity 
of the niche.  
 
The  analogy  in  organizational  foundings  holds  that  the  positive  density  effect  reflects 
legitimation. Legitimation is rather loosely defined as “social taken-for-grantedness” (Hannan 
et al. 1995, p. 510) and included all positive feedback processes that encourage entrepreneurs 
to  start  new  business.  Most  importantly,  the  current  stock  of  organizations  generates 
information that diffuses to potential entrepreneurs inducing them to start the same type of 
business (Hannan et  al. 1995, p. 512), which  can be thought of as  a form of knowledge 
spillover, the term we will use in the remainder of the study.
1 The negative effect of density 
dependence reflects market competition, which is assumed to rise non-linearly, as each new 
competitor  entering  the  population  has  an  increasing  marginal  effect  on  the  level  of 
competition. 
 
Accordingly,  and  following  notation  of  Bigelow  et  al.  (1997),  the  core  model  of 
organizational ecology can be written as: 
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1 Such an interpretation of legitimation is consistent with the notion of “cognitive legitimacy” introduced by 




(t) stands for the yearly organizational founding rate and Nt for the density of the 
population (i.e., the number of organizations) at time t. The hypotheses hold that 
￿ 1 > 0 and 
￿ 2 < 0. The model is often extended with dummies referring to particular historical periods 
that affect the founding rates, for example, war periods or periods that are characterised by a 
particular dominant technology (Bigelow et al. 1997). 
 
An interesting conceptual extension to the model, which we use in our analysis of urban 
clusters in the global fashion design industry, was proposed by Hannan et al. (1995) who 
introduced  different  geographical  levels  of  analysis  and  then  analysed  at  which  levels 
knowledge spillovers and competition take place.
2 Hannan et al. (1995) analysed national 
founding  rates  of  automobile  manufacturers  in  five  European  countries  and  found  that 
competition took place at national level, while knowledge spillovers were global. Similarly, 
looking at founding rates of automobile manufacturers in different U.S. regions, Bigelow et 




We will make use of the multi-level approach introduced by Hannan and colleagues when 
analysing  the  founding  rates  of  fashion  houses  at  the  urban  level  and  the  global  level. 
However, we question the universality of the results of Hannan et al. (1995) and Bigelow et 
al. (1997) as we expect knowledge spillovers to be local and competition between fashion 
designers to be global. The reason for the reverse hypothesis lies in the specificity of fashion 
design. Given the short product lifecycle (usually six months) there is a rapid turnover of 
                                                 
2  The  use  of  nested  scales  need  not  only  refer  to  geographical  scales,  but  could  also  refer  to  product 
classifications, or any other type of hierarchical classification. 
 
3 For a more general discussion on how industrial dynamics and economic geography can be combined, see Van 
Wissen (2004) and Boschma and Frenken (2006) and Frenken and Boschma (2007). Geroski (2001) provides an 
overview of the industrial dynamics and organisational ecology literatures. 
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ideas with the values of ideas decaying rapidly in time. What is more, ideas typically spread 
through people moving between companies or setting up their own spinoff companies, and 
these movements are predominantly local (Wenting, 2007). As a consequence, knowledge 
spillovers  will  occur  primarily  within  design  clusters  rather  than  between  them.  The 
characteristics  of  fashion  design  are  fundamentally  different  from  manufacturing  where 
knowledge  is  more  accumulative  and  more  codified  in  patents,  standards,  handbooks  and 
machinery. This means that knowledge remains relevant over a longer period and can be 
circulated at lower costs. Both aspects of manufacturing knowledge render global spillovers to 
be  more  pervasive.  Concerning  the  competition  effect  in  organizational  ecology,  we  also 
expect  fashion  industry  to  be  different  from  manufacturing  as  fashion  designers  compete 
globally for clients. Fashion being a luxury good and insensitive for transportation costs, the 
locus of consumption is not tied to the origin of production. By contrast, at least historically, 
manufacturing goods compete in regional markets because the transportation costs account for 
a large share of total costs.
4 
 
So, we get: 
 
) exp( ) (
2
2 1 0 t it i N n t b b b l + + =     (2) 
 
For each city i and n stands for urban density. Again, the hypotheses hold that 
￿ 1 > 0 and 
￿ 2 < 0. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
                                                 




To test our hypotheses we collected a unique dataset on entries in the global fashion industry. 
The data we collected stem from various sources, most importantly, the Thames & Hudson 
Dictionary of Fashion and Fashion Designers by O’Hara Callan (1998) and Watson’s (2004) 
20th Century Fashion: 100 Years of Style by Decade and Designer. The data were updated till 
the year 2005 using Internet sources, of which designerhistory.com is the most notable. Our 
data encompasses information on 565 of the world’s top designers in the haute couture and 
ready-to-wear industry, from the start of the industry in 1858 through 2005.  
 
From the total of 565 designers mentioned in our sources, 510 designers started their own 
firm. This means that 55 designers have been active as free-lancers or employees, and are left 
out of the analysis. The majority of designers were active in the ready-to-wear market. We 
counted  147  entrants  in  haute  couture  and  406  entrants  in  the  ready-to-wear  industry 
reflecting the larger size of the ready-to-wear market compared to the elitist haute couture 
market. The 43 cases that produced haute couture and ready-to-wear fashion are included in 
both populations. 
 
Figure 1 shows the total number of entries and exits in the ready-to-wear segment each year, 
as well as the industry’s world population. Here it is clear that the industry has witnessed 
sustained growth throughout the whole period.
5 Figure 2 shows the same data for each of the 
four dominant clusters being Paris, London, New York and Milan. Figure 3 and 4 show the 
same data for the haute couture population. The figures show that Paris dominates the haute 
                                                 
5 While in  most  manufacturing industries, the  number of  firms  first rises and then  falls during an industry 
‘shakeout’ (Hannan et al. 1995; Klepper and Simons, 1997), this pattern is absent in the top of fashion design. 
This is likely a consequence of the sustainability of small market niches, and the relative ease of their creation. In 
fashion design, scale economies in production are of less importance compared to manufacturing activities. 
Indeed, fashion designers are more concerned with remaining creatively relevant and maintaining an image of 
exclusivity (Banks, 2000). 
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couture industry from its onset in 1858 up until today. Yet, Paris started relatively late in the 
ready-to-wear segment and did not achieve dominance over New York or London in this 
segment. At present, New York and London even outnumber Paris in terms of the number of 
ready-to-wear fashion houses. 
 
 
  <Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 around here> 
 
 
In order to test the two hypotheses (spillovers are local and competition is global), we include 
density dependence of all types at all levels. So, we let founding depend on local density and 
local density squared and on global density and global density squared. Following Hannan et 
al. (1995) and Bigelow et al. (1997) we define global density as the density of fashion houses 
outside the city in question (also referred to as total remaining density).  
 
We limit the analysis to ready-to-wear foundings as a distinct segment in the global fashion 
industry. Restricting the analysis to the ready-to-wear segment allows us to analyse the effect 
of the presence of haute couture on the formation of the new ready-to-wear cluster in the 
second part of the paper. The ready-to-wear segment started in 1891 while the data ends in 
2005. Analysing the four largest clusters (Paris, London, New York and Milan) and pooling 
the observations, we have a total of 460 yearly founding rates. As controls, we use dummies 
for the two world wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) where we distinguish between the U.S 
(WW_US) and Europe (WW_EUROPE). The two World Wars have most likely disrupted the 
European market (Merlo and Polese, 2006). 
 
Our dependent variable counts the number of yearly foundings and should therefore be dealt 
with as ‘count data’. Probably the most common regression model applied in this respect is 10 
 
the  Poisson  regression  model,  which  is  estimated  by  means  of  maximum  likelihood 
estimation  techniques.  However,  due  to  overdispersion  we  resort  to  estimating  Negative 
Binomial  regression  models  instead,  which  add  a  parameter  a  to  the  model  capturing 
unobserved heterogeneity and thus correcting for overdispersion in the data.  
 
Apart from the problem of overdispersion, our dataset also suffers from an excessive amount 
of zeros relative to the amount of actual observed interregional collaborations. Although the 
negative  binomial  regression  model  already  improves  upon  the  under-prediction  of zeros, 
Vuong  tests  indicate  that  we  should  use  a  zero-inflated  variant  of  the  negative  binomial 
regression model. The zero-inflated negative binomial model considers the existence of two 
(latent) groups within the population: a group having strictly zero counts and a group having a 
non-zero probability of counts different than zero. Correspondingly, its estimation process 
consists of two parts. The first part contains a logit regression of the predictor variables on the 
probability that there is no founding at all. The second part contains a negative binomial 
regression on the probability of each count for the group that has a non-zero probability of 
count different than zero. Since we are merely interested in the rate of foundings and only use 
the zero inflated model to correct for the excessive number of zero counts, we only report the 






Table 1 shows the  results of our analysis. Model 1 reports on the  results assuming local 
spillovers and local competition. Both estimates are significant and of the expected sign with 
                                                 
6 Results for the zero inflated part are available on request. 
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density  having  a  positive  effect  on  foundings  and  density  squared  a  negative  effect  on 
foundings. Yet, when we introduce global spillovers and global competition in Model 2, we 
observe that local competition is no longer significant while global competition is significant. 
This  result  supports  our  main  hypothesis  that  the  geographical  structure  of  the  fashion 
industry is such that designers learn locally while they compete globally. Local spillovers 
promote  further  entry  within  each  cluster,  while  global  competition  ultimately  limits  the 
growth of the industry as a whole. 
 
The finding is important because it shows the specificity of the fashion design industry and its 
fundamental  difference  with  the  automobile  industry,  for  which  the  opposite  results  were 
found (Hannan et al., 1995; Bigelow et al. 1997). The results also suggest that local spillovers 
are important and drive, at least partially, the high degree of clustering of the industry in just 
four ‘global cities’, and the persistence of this clustering over time. 
 
 
5. Institutional lock-in? 
 
Few industries have seen such a stable geography as fashion design with the main clusters of 
today being the same as a century ago. Yet, an important shift has taken place during the last 
century with Paris losing its dominance. The share of Paris-based firms started to fall rapidly 
from around 70 percent up until 1923, to 36 percent in 1941. Currently less than 25 percent of 
the top fashion houses in the world are located in Paris. At the same time, London, New York 




Some have attributed the marked shift in spatial concentration of the industry to the rapid 
growth of the ready-to-wear market in the 1950s and 1960s as a new segment next to haute 
couture  (Waddell  2004).  The  term  ready-to-wear  describes  a  method  of  buying  clothes 
whereby the customer no longer has to have clothes made to measure. As such, ready-to-wear 
is a simplified form of high fashion and demands less artistic skill from the designer. Yet, it 
also involves complicated sizing problems  and manufacture in large quantities as well as 
professional  marketing  as  in  the  clothing  industry  more  generally.  However,  within  the 
clothing industry the term ready-to-wear has come to mean the more exclusive designer end 
of the market.  
 
Initially, Parisian haute couturiers were not allowed to practice ready-to-wear according to the 
guidelines of the Syndicate Chamber of Parisian Couture (Waddell, 2004). This association, 
founded in 1911, regulated the profession of the French haute couturiers. As a consequence 
French couturiers entered the ready-to-wear market much later than designers outside Paris. It 
took until 1973 for a separate entity to be established in Paris setting guidelines for ready-to-
wear, while similar institutions were setup much earlier in London (in 1947), Milan (in 1958) 
and New York (in 1962). The attempts by the Syndicate can be understood as a case of 
institutional lock-in (Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2005), where firms with vested interest in a 
particular line of business try to raise entry barriers for a new line of business as to protect the 
meaning and exclusivity of (Parisian) fashion. 
 
The  strategy  of  the  Syndicate  was,  however,  just  one  manifestation  of  a  more  general 
resistance within Paris against ‘commercialisation’ and ‘popularisation’ of fashion design. 
Parisian designers traditionally design for the rich-and-famous elite and continued to do so 
after the emergence of ready-to-wear. The whole concept of haute couture is that fashion is, 13 
 
and should be, artistic, exclusive and tailor-made. By contrast, London, Milan and New York 
saw  a  democratization  of  design  consumption  with  youngsters  expressing  themselves  in 
ready-to-wear fashion and entrepreneurs quickly reacting to this growing demand for fashion 
(Waddell, 2004). 
 
One can expect the emergence and growth of the ready-to-wear segment in each cluster to be 
dependent on the presence of haute couture designers. Generally, the development of new 
industries profit from the presence of related industries (Klepper, 2002). The argument holds 
that  knowledge  and  practices  can  be  easily  transplanted  from  the  related  industry  to  the 
emerging  industry  within  the  same  cluster.
7  In  an  organizational  ecology  framework,  the 
effect  of  haute  couture  designers  on  the  development  of  ready-to-wear  segment  can  be 
introduced by extending the model with the density of haute couture designers. The effect of 
haute couture density on foundings in the ready-to-wear segment is expected to be positive. 
Each haute couture designer could decide to change its business and to switch to the more 
profitable line of business in the ready-to-wear segment. Indeed, quite a number of designers 
decided to do so: 29 percent of all entrants in haute couture branched out into the new market. 
A second mechanism through which a population of related industry might contribute to entry 
in  the  new  segment  is  through  local  spinoff  generation  (Klepper,  2002;  Boschma  and 
Wenting, 2007).  In our  case, 97 out of 406 ready-to-wear entrepreneurs (24 percent) had 
previous work experience in the haute couture industry. To test whether local haute couture 
density fuelled entry in the new segment, we extend the specification in Eq. (2), and get: 
 
) exp( ) ( 3
2
2 1 0 it t it i m N n t b b b b l + + + =     (3) 
                                                 
7 Examples include the emergence of the car industry out of the bicycles and engine industries (Wood, 1988; 
Klepper,  2002;  Boschma  and  Wenting,  2007),  the  emergence  of  the  tire  industry  from  the  rubber  industry 
(Klepper  2007),  the  emergence  of  the  television  industry  from  the  radio  industry  (Klepper  2007),  and  the 
emergence of the film industry out of theatres (Mezias and Kuperman, 2001). 14 
 
 
Where mit stands for the yearly density in haute couture in city i. The hypotheses hold that 
￿ 1 > 0, 
￿ 2 < 0, and 
￿ 3 > 0. 
 
The  model  specification  in  Eq.  3,  however,  neglects  institutional  differences  between  the 
fashion clusters. Following our previous discussion on the history of the Parisian cluster, the 
more powerful and conservative Syndicate in Paris may have been better able to block entries 
than its counterparts in competing clusters, implying that entry rates in Paris are structurally 
lower  than  elsewhere.  To  address  the  specificity  of  the  Parisian  context,  we  introduce  a 
dummy  variable  for  entry  rates  in  Paris.  The  hypothesis  holds  that  its  sign  is  negative 
reflecting the ‘institutional lock-in’ within the Parisian fashion community.  
 
In Table 2 we tested the extended organizational ecology model in Model 3.
8 Surprisingly, the 
density of haute couture designers did not fuel the cluster of ready-to-wear with new entrants 
as  the  coefficient  is  insignificant.  The  absence  of  any  positive  effect  of  haute  couture 
designers  on  foundings  in  ready-to-wear  may,  however,  may  be  caused  by  the  specific 
Parisian context, where the presence of haute couture designers possibly had a negative effect 
on the formation of the ready-to-wear cluster due to its unionised structure. 
 
Model  4  replicates  Model  3  but  extends  the  PARIS  dummy.  The  results  indicate  two 
important phenomena. First, Paris indeed shows a structurally lower founding rate compared 
to the other three clusters suggesting a specific local (institutional) context which was less 
conducive  for  ready-to-wear  entrepreneurs  to  start  a  business.  Second,  our  previous 
                                                 
8 We do not include the square of haute couture density, because the two separate market segments do not 
compete for the same clientele. 
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hypothesis that haute couture density facilitated the formation of the ready-to-wear clusters is 
now supported with the coefficient being positive and significant. It is only after controlling 
for the local specificity of the Paris cluster that the expected positive effect of haute couture 
density can be observed. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Having provided the first organizational ecology study on a ‘creative industry’, we showed 
that the geography and industrial evolution of the fashion design industry is rather different 
from the manufacturing logic underlying the automobile industry analyzed previously. Given 
the rapid turnover of ideas, knowledge spillovers occur primarily locally, promoting further 
entry within the cluster. At the same time, clients for luxury fashion can be found globally, 
which  means  that  firms  compete  both  with  firms  in  their  own  cluster  and  elsewhere.  By 
contrast, knowledge in manufacturing industries is more accumulative and codified allowing 
for  global  circulation,  while  manufacturing  goods  compete  in  regional  markets  because 
transportation costs are relatively high. 
 
Our results thus provide an explanation for the extreme and persistent geographic clustering in 
creative  industries  like  fashion  design.  Similar  creative  industries  like  film  production 
(Hollywood,  Bollywood) and publishing (New  York,  London) may well exhibit the same 
patterns as found in this study. 
 
Apart from profiting of an existing density of ready-to-wear designers, the growth of ready-
to-wear  clusters  was  also  facilitated  by  the  presence  of  haute  couture  designers.  Being  a 16 
 
related industry, it provided a pool of possible entrants, thus giving rise to a process of related 
diversification (Klepper, 2002; Boschma and Wenting, 2007). However, though Paris had the 
largest  concentration  of  haute  couture  designers,  it  did  not  succeed  to  dominate  the  new 
ready-to-wear segment, as it showed structurally lower entry rates than competing clusters. 
We attribute this failure to a form of ‘institutional lock-in’ where vested interested of Parisian 
haute couture frustrated the development of ready-to-wear. 
 
The case, though to be generalized for other industries, illustrates some general concerns that 
can be relevant in local policy-making. The prospects for developing local clusters are most 
favourable when the new cluster can draw on resources (mainly entrepreneurs with relevant 
knowledge) that are present in existing, but related, activities (Frenken et al. 2007). Yet, the 
concentration of such resources can also hamper new lines of development if seen as a threat 
by the incumbents. It is the role of policymakers to stay out of networks of vested interests 






Aldrich, H.E., Fiol, C.M. (1994), Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation, 
Academy of Management Review, 19(4), pp. 645-670. 
Banks, M., Lovatt, A., O’Connor, J., Raffo, C. (2000), Risk and trust in the cultural industries. 
Geoforum, 31, pp. 453–464. 
Bigelow, L.S., Carroll, G.R., Seidel, M.D.L. (1997), Legitimation, geographical scale, and 
organizational density: regional patterns of foundings of American Automobile Producers, 
1885-1981. Social Science Research, 26, pp. 377–398. 
Boschma,  R.A.,  Frenken,  K.  (2006),  Why  is  economic  geography  not  an  evolutionary 
science? Towards an evolutionary economic geography. Journal of Economic Geography 
6(3), pp. 273–302. 
Boschma, R.A., Wenting, R. (2007), The spatial evolution of the British automobile industry. 
Does location matter? Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(2), pp. 213–238. 
Carroll,  G.R.,  Hannan,  M.T.  (2000)  The  Demography  of  Corporations  and  Industries. 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
De Marly, D. (1980), The History of Haute Couture 1850-1950. New York: Holmes & Meier 
publishers. 
De Rethy, E., Perreau, J.L. (2002), Christian Dior: The Early Years 1947-57. New York: 
Vendome Press. 
Frenken,  K.,  Boschma,  R.A.  (2007),  A  theoretical  framework  for  evolutionary  economic 
geography:  industrial  dynamics  and  urban  growth  as  a  branching  process.  Journal  of 
Economic Geography 7(5), pp. 635–649. 
Frenken, K., Van Oort, F., Verburg, T. (2007), Related variety, unrelated variety and regional 
economic growth. Regional Studies, 41(5), pp. 685–697. 
Geroski, P.A. (2001), Exploring the Niche Overlaps Between Organizational Ecology and 
Industrial Economics, Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(2), pp. 507-540. 
Grabher, G. (1993), The weakness of strong ties: the lock-in of regional development in the 
Ruhr area. In G. Grabher (ed.) The Embedded Firm, London: Routledge, pp. 255–277. 
Hannan,  M.T.,  Carroll,  G.R.  (1992),  Dynamics  of  Organization  Populations:  Density, 
Legitimation, and Competition. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hannan, M.T., Carroll, G.R., Dundon, E.A., Torres, J.C. (1995), Organizational evolution in a 
multinational context: entries of automobile manufacturers in Belgium, Britain, France, 
Germany, and Italy. American Sociological Review, 60(4), pp. 509–528. 
Hannan,  M.T.,  Freeman,  J.  (1989),  Organizational  Ecology.  Cambridge  MA:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Hassink, R. (2005), How to unlock regional economies from path dependency? From learning 
region to learning cluster. European Planning Studies, 13(4), pp. 521–535. 
Klepper, S. (1997), Industry life cycles, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11, pp. 645–666. 
Klepper S. (2002), The capabilities of new firms and the evolution of the U.S. automobile 
industry, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11, pp. 645–666. 
Klepper, S. (2007), The evolution of geographic structure in new industries. In K. Frenken 
(ed.), Applied Evolutionary Economics and Economic Geography (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar), pp. 69-92. 
Klepper, S., Simons, K.L. (1997), Technological extinctions of industrial firms; an inquiry 
into their nature and causes, Industrial and Corporate Change, 6, pp. 379–460. 
Merlo, E, and F. Polese (2006), Turning fashion into business: The emergence of Milan as an 
international fashion hub, Business History Review, 80 (3), pp. 415-447. 18 
 
Mezias, S.J. and J.C. Kuperman (2001), The community dynamics of entrepreneurship: The 
birth of the American film industry, 1895-1929, Journal of Business Venturing, 16(3), pp. 
209-233. 
O’Hara  Callan,  G.  (1998),  The  Thames  &  Hudson  Dictionary  of  Fashion  and  Fashion 
Designers. London: Harry N. Abrams. 
Scott, A.J. (2000), The Cultural Economy of Cities. London: Sage Publications. 
Sischy,  I.  (2004),  The  Journey  Of  A  Woman:  20  Years  Of  Donna  Karan,  New  York: 
Assouline. 
Van Wissen, L. (2004), A spatial interpretation of the density dependence model in industrial 
demography. Small Business Economics, 22 (3–4), pp. 253–264. 
Waddell, G. (2004), How Fashion Works: Couture, Ready-to-Wear and Mass Production. 
Blackwell Publishing: New York (USA). 
Watson, L. (2004), 20th Century Fashion: 100 Years of Style by Decade and Designer, in 
Association with Vogue. New York: Firefly Books. 
Wenting, R. (2007), Inheritance of creativity: A genealogical analysis of the fashion design 

























































































































































Paris London New York Milan
 20 
 






































































































































































Paris London New York Milan21 
 
Table 1. Estimates of the zero-inflated binomial regression analyses 
(dependent variable: yearly founding rate in ready-to-wear) 
 
   Model 1  Model 2 
n  0.042  0.040 
stand.error  (0.011)  (0.013) 
p-value  0.000  0.003 
n
2  -0.0003  -0.0002 
stand.error  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
p-value  0.018  0.164 
N    0.005 
stand.error    (0.006) 
p-value    0.390 
N
2    -0.00003 
stand.error    (0.00002) 
p-value    0.096 
WW_US  2.465  2.932 
stand.error  (2.344)  (2.328) 
p-value  0.293  0.208 
WW_EUROPE  -1349  -1.642 
stand.error  (2.260)  (2.289) 
p-value  0.551  0.473 
Constant   -0.745   -0.788 
stand.error  (0.222)  (0.286) 
p-value   0.001  0.006 
 
Log likelihood  -418.206  -405.516 
LR Chi square  45.91  61.65 
Number of observations  460  460 




Table 2. Estimates of the zero-inflated binomial regression analyses; 
 (dependent variable: yearly founding rate in ready-to-wear) 
 
   Model 3  Model 4 
n  0.043  0.031 
stand.error  (0.014)  (0.015) 
p-value  0.002  0.046 
n
2  -0.0002  -0.0001 
stand.error  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
p-value  0.127   0.454 
N  0.003  0.007 
stand.error  (0.006)  (0.006) 
p-value  0.557  0.275 
N
2  -0.00003   -0.00004  
stand.error  (0.00002)  (0.00002) 
p-value  0.150  0.055 
m  -0.005  0.063 
stand.error  (0.007)  (0.030) 
p-value  0.536  0.036 
PARIS    -1.359 
stand.error    (0.579) 
p-value    0.019 
WW_US  2.916  2.577 
stand.error  (2.469)  (2.244) 
p-value  0.238  0.251 
WW_EUROPE  -1.709  -1.476 
stand.error  (2.442)  (2.214) 
p-value  0.484  0.505 
Constant  -0.694  -1.008 
stand.error  (0.303)  (0.359) 
p-value  0.022  0.005 
 
Log likelihood  -405.223  -401.232 
LR Chi square  61.82  66.04 
Number of observations  460  460 
Number of non-zero observations  175  175 
 
 
 